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Abstract: In this paper, we examine the evolution of the Japanese financial structure, in order to 
challenge the expected incidences of the financial liberalization. We compute financial 
intermediation ratios for Japan (1979-2004) on a book value basis. According to our results, the 
intermediation ratio has remained quite stable, at around 85%. This stability is the result of two 
opposite trends: a decrease in credits and an increase in financial securities owned by financial 
(mostly, non-banking) institutions. These two trends are partly the consequence of the heavier 
weight of the Government in domestic external financing, which is traditionally less financed by 
credits than companies are. Besides, these two trends would not have appeared if we had used 
intermediation ratios in market value or other traditional indicators (Deposits/GDP, Loans to 
private sector/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, etc.). Our results provide evidence for a 
very close relationship between intermediate financings and market financings and tend to reject 
the hypothesis of the Japanese financial system’s convergence toward a capital market-based 
system. 
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The measurement of financial intermediation in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
During the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese banking sector underwent a 
partial financial liberalization. Manufacturing firms gained in independence vis-à-vis banks more 
quickly than did savers. Consequently, banks stayed large, but they had to find new opportunities 
for loans as the banking regulation prevented them from redeploying their activity. Some of the 
Japanese banks were even reluctant to write off bad loans and enter into forbearance lending 
(Kobayashi, Saita and Sekine, 2002).  
For Hoshi and Kashyap (1999), the asymmetry in the liberalization process played a key role in 
the banking crisis and needed to be corrected by a deeper deregulation. The Japanese Big Bang 
initiated in 1996 was aimed at radically transforming the financial system toward a market-based 
system. Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) expected the Big Bang would lead “more firms to migrate to 
capital market financing”, and would induce “a massive contraction in the size of the Japanese 
banking sector”. Anderson and Makhija (1999) underlined, as a result of this financial 
liberalization, “a disintermediation evident in Japanese balance sheets”. Such an analysis of the 
financial mutation incidences is not specific to Japan, but is often applied to many other countries 
(see, for instance, Allen and Santomero, 2001 and Rajan and Zingales, 2003a). Three points are 
generally considered.  
The first one deals with the incidence of financial mutation on the relative importance of 
financial intermediaries compared to capital markets. A current view is that financial development 
is prejudicial to banks. Capital markets compete with banks on both sides of the bank's balance 
sheet. On the assets side, the increase in claims undermines credit. On the liabilities side, the 
development of collective saving (which occurred relatively late in Japan) increases the cost of 
resources collected by banks. As a consequence, traditional banking firms should decline and 
there should be a necessary redeployment towards other activities such as financial engineering, 
risk management, etc. (Boot and Thakor, 2000). In the specific case of Japan, the decline of 
traditional banking would also be accompanied by a weakening of the main banking relationships.  
The second point relates to the global evolution of financial systems. Nowadays, the majority 
opinion puts forward the idea of a standardization of financial systems toward a capital market-
based system, in opposition to a bank-based system. Interestingly, the only empirical study 
specifically dedicated to this phenomenon (Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrell, 1999) finds neither a 
global trend toward disintermediation nor a convergence toward capital market-based financial 
systems in the major European economies (France, Germany or the United Kingdom) at a 
general level. 
The third question concerns the relative merits of bank-based versus capital market-based 
systems (for a comprehensive discussion on comparative financial systems, see Allen and Gale, 
2000 and Levine, 2002). For a long time, the literature seemed to conclude in favor of capital 
market-based systems, at least for developed countries (Boyd and Smith, 1998). However, several 
recent studies using cross-country comparisons challenge this idea: although global financial 
development is a significant determinant of economic growth, there is no support for either the 
bank-based or market-based view (see Levine, 2005). 
One major problem with this traditional approach is that financing structure is always a challenge 
to quantify (see, for a discussion, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Consider, for 
instance, the Japanese case. While Japan is still referred to as an archetype of a bank-based 
system, Tokyo is one of the leading financial centers in the world; in 2003, Tokyo was ranked 
first in market capitalization of newly listed domestic shares. Moreover, the Japanese corporate 
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bond market is small, but the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) market is the largest in the 
world. At first sight, one can interpret this as evidence of the convergence of the Japanese 
financial system toward a capital market-based system. But it seems more interesting to see it as 
evidence of a close connection between banks and capital markets in the financial system.  
Beyond the empirical problem, a more fundamental issue challenges the ground of the traditional 
approach. The latter considers markets and intermediaries as two substitutable and opposite 
modalities. But one should not ignore the important interactions between markets and 
intermediaries: the services provided by each may overlap, and it is very likely that there is cross-
fertilization between markets and intermediaries. In accordance with Levine (2005), we suggest 
that the debate should not focus on bank-based versus market-based systems. By nature, the 
traditional approach cannot cover the whole variety of financial systems. Moreover, this 
dichotomous vision of financial systems is gradually being replaced by theoretical analyses that 
underline the complementary quality of financial services. For instance, Bodie and Merton (1995, 
2004) argue in favor of a functional approach instead of an institutional one; in this case, banks 
and capital markets are not opposed, but assume largely identical functions (financing, portfolio 
management, risk management, liquidity insurance), although in different ways. Moreover, 
numerous studies challenge the convergence hypothesis by highlighting the role of historical or 
institutional characteristics such as the legal system, the political context, the cultural and religious 
legacies, the geographical endowments or the social capital that may shape national financial 
systems (see, again, Levine 2005). In any case, these conflicting analyses highlight the need for 
better empirical measures of financing structure. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the financial structure in Japan in order to challenge 
the expected incidences of the financial liberalization. There is little empirical evidence 
concerning the evolution of the Japanese financial structure and our paper attempts to fill this 
gap. Traditional measures of financial structure1 focus more on the level of financial activity, give 
a narrow vision of financial intermediation and do not capture its changing nature, nor do they 
correct for changes in security prices. In this paper, we compute financial intermediation ratios 
which do not suffer from these drawbacks. In our breakdown of external financing, we do not 
consider only direct and indirect financing, but we also break down the total financial 
intermediation ratio into the sum of the credit intermediation ratio and the market intermediation 
ratio. This finer breakdown allows us to appreciate the modalities and the changing nature of the 
financial intermediation. Moreover, as flows are too erratic for long-term studies, we use stock 
series. But stock series are not fully suitable since they are usually expressed in market value, 
which amplifies financial cycles. Therefore, we correct market value to obtain book value. That is 
particularly significant in the case of Japan, whose stock exchange market was affected these last 
decades by episodes of very strong volatility and bull and bear markets.  
Our study offers new stylized facts concerning the Japanese financial system: the rise of the 
capital markets, which started at the beginning of the 1980’s, did not involve a disintermediation 
and, symmetrically, the decline in stock market prices, at the beginning of the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the 2000s, did not support a re-intermediation in Japan. The financial 
intermediation ratio remained stable overall between 1979 and 2004. This stability of the financial 
intermediation ratio is the result of two opposite trends: a decrease in the share of credits in the 
domestic nonfinancial sectors' external financing (i.e. the credit intermediation ratio) and an 
increase in the share of investments in claims carried out by banks and other financial 
intermediaries (i.e. the market intermediation ratio). The first trend results from the decrease in 
credits requested by corporations and from the reduced share of corporate fund raisings in 
domestic external financing relative to government, which is traditionnaly less financed by 
credits. Similarly, the second trend results from the increase in financial institutions' investments 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Edvey and Hidving (1995), Allen and Santomero (2001) or Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
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in securities issued by the domestic nonfinancial sectors and from the growing share of 
government in domestic external financing. In other words, the global evolution of 
intermediation ratios is explained both by the change in the relative weight of governement and 
corporations in domestic external financing and by significant changes in the financial behavior 
of domestic nonfinancial agents. The nature of financial intermediairies’ participation in the 
financing of the Japanese economy, therefore, has changed: the increase in claims investments 
has compensated for the relative fall in credits. However, our results suggest that this evolution in 
the supply of financing was not due to a proactive behavior of financial intermediairies, but 
rather mostly reflects the increase in the government need for financing.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and defines the intermediation 
scope. Section 3 provides results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Data  
Financial national accounts of Japan (Flow of Funds Accounts) are downloaded from the Bank 
of Japan website. We use the SNA 93 database recently retropolated to 1979.2 The Bank of Japan 
also provides documents concerning the Japanese channels of fund-raising. These files give 
outstandings of shares and other equities on a book value basis and outstandings of securities 
other than shares on a face value basis. Moreover, it allows us to focus on domestic financing to 
domestic sectors. 
 
2.2 Intermediation ratios 
A financial intermediation ratio measures the share of intermediate financings in the total of the 
external financings granted to the domestic nonfinancial sector (DNF). The denominator of the 
ratio (total of the external financings) is obtained by adding loans and claims issued by the DNF. 
As we consider only intersectorial external financings, we exclude trade credits. The numerator of 
the ratio (intermediate financings) has two components:  
- the first one we call credit intermediation, it is the total of loans granted by domestic private 
and public financial institutions (FI);  
- the second one we call market intermediation, it is the sum of claims issued by DNF and 
submitted by all domestic FI. Because only aggregate accounts are available, to identify 
the stocks of claims held by FI over each sector (NFC, GOV and Overseas) we assume 
that the fraction of a given category of claims, issued by DNF and purchased by a given 
category of FI, is equal to the fraction of the same category of claims held by the 
particular FI, whatever the issuer. If, for instance, insurance companies and pension 
funds hold α% of the total stock of bonds, the hypothesis is made that they hold in the 
same manner α% of the stock of bonds issued by NFC, α% of those issued by GOV and 
α% of those issued by Overseas. 
The sum of credit intermediation and market intermediation forms what we call total intermediation. Three 
intermediation ratios are computed: the credit intermediation ratio (or strict ratio), the market 
intermediation ratio, and the ratio of total intermediation (or large ratio as the sum of the two 
                                                          
2 In a first draft, before the retropolation of the SNA 93 database, we used two databases: SNA 68 for 1970-1999 
(quarterly data) and SNA 93 for 1990-2003 (annual data until 1998, and quarterly data since). Results were qualitavely 
the same and are avalaible upon request. 
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preceding ones). Each ratio can be expressed for the DNF sector, or for the two main 
institutional nonfinancial sectors: private and public nonfinancial corporations (NFC), and 
general government (GOV). The market intermediation ratio can also be broken down by type of 
FI active in Japan, to measure the distribution of market share between “banks” and “non-bank 
FI”. 
 
2.3 Market value versus book value 
Generally, market value data (such as market capitalization, for example) are not appropriate to 
evaluate the level of financings. Such data integrate particularly significant price effects which 
completely hide the evolution of the financings itself (volume effect).3 This was plainly visible in 
Japan at the end of the 1980s and the 1990s (cf. Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Outstanding of shares and other equities issued by private Japanese 
nonfinancial corporations 
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Notes: Outstanding (100 million yen) of shares and other equities issued by private nonfinancial 
corporations on a market value and a book value basis (source: Flow of Funds Account, SNA 93 – Bank of 
Japan) on the left scale and Topix Index (source: Datastream) on the right scale. 
 
Stock price effects can lead to significant bias: 
− A rise in securities prices significantly weighs down the stock of claims without necessarily 
increasing external financings. It mechanically lowers the intermediation ratio. Accordingly, 
the progression of stock market capitalization is often perceived, wrongly, as the sign of a rise 
                                                          
3 Rajan and Zingales (2003b) also recognized that equity market capitalization “captures the amount of equity listed, 
not the amount of equity raised. Thus, the presence of few companies that have greatly appreciated in value can give 
the impression of a big equity market even when the amount of funds raised in the market is tiny. On the positive 
side, however, this measure is less cyclical than the previous one, and thus is better for making comparisons across 
countries and across time periods.” 
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in direct financing and a fall in intermediation.  
− The incidence is symmetrical in the case of decreasing securities prices. Indeed, on the other 
side, when stock market capitalization declines, the denominator of the ratio declines too. But 
depreciation effects should not be assimilated to a rebound of intermediate financings. 
In short, increases in stock market prices lead to the overestimation of the relative importance of 
market financings and to the underestimation of intermediate financings. In both cases, one 
would err in not distinguishing between the two distinct tendencies that cause variation in stock 
market capitalization: on the one hand, an increase or decrease in the issuance of new shares 
(volume effect) and, on the other hand, price appreciation or depreciation of the existing shares 
(price effect). 
When the intermediation ratio is computed with market values, it is impossible to distinguish 
between the “price effect” and the “volume effect”. Therefore, in this study, intermediation ratios 
are calculated on a book value basis (see section 2.1).4 
 
3. Results 
Detailed results are presented in Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix. 
 
3.1 Credit intermediation and market intermediation 
Between 1979 and 2004, external financing (excluding trade credits) granted to the Japanese 
domestic non-financial sector were multiplied by four (see Figure 2). This increase was mostly 
favourable to securities other than shares issues. This segment in the external financing increased 
from 25% to 42%, whereas the proportion of shares and other equities grew from 7% to only 
9%. At the same time, banking credits decreased from 68% to 49%. 
It is necessary, however, to underline the stability of the total intermediation ratio. It contrasts 
with the reduction of the credit intermediation ratio, which is particularly accentuated at the 
beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 3). The two components of the total ratio, namely the credit 
intermediation ratio (banking credits as a fraction of external financings) and the market 
intermediation ratio (claims investments by the FI as a fraction of external financings) each 
follow a perfectly symmetrical trend. The more the credit intermediation ratio dropped, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the more the market intermediation ratio increased. The rise of the 
market intermediation ratio translates the increasing share of the banking financial institutions 
and especially of the non-banking ones in the purchases of claims. The share of FI in 
stockholding increased at the same time as the share of securities increased in external financing. 
In 2004, almost 70% (64% in 1979) of the market financings were actually intermediate 
financings. 
                                                          
4 When national accounts are not avalaible on a book value basis, a method consists in dividing stock market 
capitalization with a stock price index. The choice of a stock price index (see Rousseau and Wachtel (2000)) poses 
problems of representativeness and does not allow one to take account of the valuation of non-listed shares. It is 
then preferable to determine a price index computed with flow and stocks data (see Capelle-Blancard and Couppey-
Soubeyran, 2003). 
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Figure 2. External Financing by the Japanese Domestic Nonfinancial Sector  
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Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis.  
 
Figure 3. Japanese intermediation ratios – Domestic Non-financial Sector  
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Notes. From top to bottom: 1) Total intermediation ratio = (loans + securities held by domestic financial 
intermediaries) / external financing by the Japanese domestic nonfinancial sector; 2) Credit intermediation ratio = 
loans / external financing by the Japanese domestic nonfinancial sector; 3) Market intermediation ratio = securities 
held by financial intermediaries / external financing by the Japanese domestic nonfinancial sector. Data: Flow of 
Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. 
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Thus, the degree of intermediation of the financings has remained stable in Japan thanks to the 
increase in securities investments by the FI, compensating as such for the fall in bank credit. 
Market development did not reduce the share of intermediate financings in the total external 
financings, but it did change the nature of the latter. Intermediate financings increasingly became 
securities investments, therefore market financings. Intermediates financings and market 
financings appear more and more integrated. 
 
3.2 The intermediation ratio and stock price effects 
In Europe and the United States, the 1990s were a period of very dynamic stock markets, so 
much so that a speculative bubble formed and then burst at the beginning of the 2000s. Starting 
from computations in market values (of stock market capitalization, of credit over external 
financings, etc.), one would find in this context a disintermediation of financing. The explanation 
is that a measurement made from market value does not allow one to distinguish between the 
increase in the supply of stock in the market financings (stock effect) and the valorization effects 
(price effect). Therefore, by mechanically decreasing the relative share of the intermediate 
financings, stock exchange valorization masks the true evolution of the latter (a relative stability 
in the case of Europe, see Capelle-Blancard and Couppey-Soubeyran 2003). 
In Japan, the 1980s were a period characterized by a growing asset price bubble and the 1990s a 
period of a huge financial crisis. Intermediation ratios based on market value during this later 
period would lead to the fallacious conclusion that intermediation rebounded. But the stock 
market crisis in Japan was not favorable to intermediation, just as the expansion of capital 
markets at the same time in Europe did not involve the fall of intermediation. In Europe, the 
decrease in the intermediation ratios in market value, due to the stock price increase, has been 
assimilated wrongly to a disintermediation of financing. In Japan, stock price decreases (notably 
observed during 1990-1992 and 2000-2003) had hidden the contraction in intermediate financing 
following the banking crisis. Our aim is not only to draw attention to obvious differences in 
absolute levels between market value and book value or to the more erratic evolution of the 
market value, but also to emphasize the distorsion of the trends. The contraction of bank credit 
(see Figure 4) is obscured if we only consider market value during 2000-2003 (the market value 
ratio remains stable and the book value ratio decreases). The trend is even fully reversed during 
1990-1992 (the market value ratio increases and the book value ratio remains stable).  
The intermediation ratio of funds raised by NFC and the ratio of funds raised by GOV have a 
common feature. In both cases, the share of credit in the external financing decreases, while the 
share of securities issuances (by both NFC and GOV) acquired by the FI increases. The ratios of 
institutional sectors are then in accordance with the global ratio, but the trends are much less 
pronounced.  
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Figure 4. Credit intermediation ratio on a book and on a market value basis 
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Notes: Credit intermediation ratio = loans / external financing. Outstanding: on market value basis and 
book value basis. Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan.  
 
 
3.3 Public versus private financial institutions market shares 
Depository corporations’ market shares have decreased gradually throughout the period: 67% in 
1979 against 54% in 2004 for loans, 42% in 1979 against 29% in 2004 for securities other than 
shares, and 41% in 1979 against 30% in 2004 for shares and other equities (see Figure 5). At the 
opposite, public financial institutions’ market shares have increased during the 1990s accordingly 
to the “ballooning theory” (see for a discussion, Yamori and Nishigaki, 2005). The public 
financial institutions took advantage of the evolution of the intermediate financing market more 
than the private non-banking institutions. 
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Figure 5. Fund-raising by the Japanese DNF sector from financial institutions 
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5a. Loans granted by financial intermediaries 
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5b. Securities other than shares hold by financial intermediaries 
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5c. Shares and other equities hold by financial intermediaries 
 
Notes: Fund-raising by the Japanese domestic nonfinancial via, from bottom to top, public financial institutions, 
depository corporations, insurance and pension funds, other financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries. Data: 
Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. 
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3.4 Intermediation ratio of institutional sectors 
For NFC (Figure 6a), the total intermediation ratio decreases slightly. The credit intermediation 
ratio started to fall by the end of the 1980s and continued to decrease significantly throughout 
the 1990s. At the same time, the share of securities issued by NFC and acquired by FI increased 
from the end of the 1980s, but was not sufficient to compensate for the fall in bank credits. As a 
consequence, the NFC global ratio fell. However, one can note that the decrease did not exceed 
10 points (between 1980 and 2000). These trends arise more clearly when one isolates the private 
NFC (the dotted lines): the credit intermediation ratio of private NFC falls from 78% in 1979 to 
59% in 2004 (against 73% to 57% for all NFC) and the market intermediation ratio increases 
from 9% to 15% (against 14% to 18% for all NFC).  
The decrease of the credit intermediation ratio is in accordance with the results obtained at the 
firm level by Hoshi & Kashyap (1999) concerning the decrease of the ratio of bank debt to 
assets, at least for large firms (38% in 1978, 28% in 1998, for all industries). The involvement of 
the banks in corporate governance also probably decreased with the relative fall of credit in 
external financing. But, because of the close relationship between market financings and 
intermediate financings, a securities issuance by a firm does not necessarily mean that this 
financing excludes banks or other financial intermediaries. In this way, firms remain dependent 
on intermediate financing. 
For GOV (Figure 6b), the global ratio remains at around 80%. The market intermediation ratio 
was already high (53%) in 1979 and grew to reach 60% in 2004. It seems that the modalities of 
public financing did not change significantly, whereas the need for external financing grew 
sharply with the public deficit. 
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Figure 6a. Japanese intermediation ratios – Domestic Nonfinancial Corporations 
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Figure 6b. Japanese intermediation ratios – General Government  
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Notes. Total intermediation ratio = (loans + securities held by financial intermediaries) / external 
financing; Credit intermediation ratio = loans / external financing; Market intermediation ratio = 
securities held by financial intermediaries / external financing. Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of 
Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Figure 5a: Private and public NFC (solid lines), private NFC 
(dotted lines).  
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3.5 The composition effect of external financings  
There was a significant modification in the composition of external financings in Japan between 
1979 and 2004 (see Figure 7). NFC external financings increased until the early 1990s and 
declined thereafter, while GOV external financings were in a strong uptrend. 
Consequently, the share of GOV in domestic external financing increased largely at the expense 
of the NFC share. This gives rise to a significant composition effect of external financings in the 
total evolution (see Figure 8). This composition effect amplifies both the decrease in the credit 
intermediation ratio and the increase in the market intermediation ratio. It is particularly 
significant for the market intermediation ratio. With an unchanged composition in external 
financing5, the credit intermediation ratio would have dropped by 14 points over the period 
instead of 27, and the market intermediation ratio would have increased by 22 points instead of 
42 (see Table 1). These shadow measures give the genuine extent, which is significantly lower, of 
the changes in financial behavior.  
 
Table 1. Breakdown of the global evolution of intermediation ratios over the period 
 Total evolution Pure variation effect Composition effect 
∆ Credit intermediation ratio 0.73 0.86 0.84 
∆ Market intermediation ratio 1.75 1.22 1.42 
Notes: Multiplier coefficients of intermediation ratios between 1979 and 2004. For the credit intermediation ratio, 
0.73 = 0.86 × 0.84: the credit intermediation ratio decreased by 27% during the period and this total evolution 
combines an external financings composition effect as strong as the pure variation effect. For the market 
intermediation ratio, 1.75 = 1.22 × 1.42: without change in the external financings composition, the market 
intermediation ratio would have increased by only 22%. 
 
                                                          
5 We retain the composition of the beginning period (1979), that is 57% for NFC and 24% for GOV.  
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Figure 7. External Financing by the Japanese Domestic Nonfinancial Sector 
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Figure 8. Japanese intermediation ratios  
With and without change in the external financings composition 
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Notes: Credit intermediation ratio = loans / external financing; Market intermediation ratio = securities 
held by financial intermediaries / external financing. Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. 
Outstandings on a book value basis.  
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3.6 Intermediation ratios versus other indicators of the degree of financial intermediation 
Many indicators are used to assess financial development or to measure the relative weight of 
financial and banking intermediation. In addition to the three ratios computed above – the credit 
intermediation ratio (1a), the market intermediation ratio (1b), the total intermediation ratio (1c) –
others indicators can be considered (see Table 2). 
Edey and Hviding (1995)6 use: the ratio of financial assets of all domestic sectors to GDP (2); the 
ratio of financial assets of financial institutions (including banks) to financial assets of all 
domestic sectors (3); the ratio of financial assets of the banking sector to financial assets of all 
financial institutions (4). In Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2003b), three other indicators are used: 
the ratio of bank loans to the private sector and GDP (5); the ratio of commercial and savings 
bank deposits to GDP (6); the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (7). A last indicator is 
sometimes used which, however, measures the dynamics of capital markets more than financial 
development itself: the value of share trading, that is the total amount of transactions divided by 
GDP (8).7 
The comparison of these various indicators calls for several observations.8 
Only intermediation ratios say something about the financing structure: (2) measures the size of the financial 
sector; (3) gives the relative size of the financial intermediaries portfolio; (4) measures the weight 
of banks among the financial intermediaries; (5) and (6) measure more the level of the traditional 
banking activities than the relative importance of the banks compared to the capital markets in 
financing; (7) and (8) focus only on listed equities.  
These indicators give a more or less broad vision of financial intermediation: (5) and (6) give a narrow vision 
of financial intermediation, like (1a); (3) measures only FI participation in market financings, like 
(1b); among all these indicators, only the total intermediation ratio (1c) offers a precise 
measurement of the weight of the banks (considered at the same time in their traditional activity 
of credit and their activity of claims investment) and other FI in the external financing of the 
DNF. 
All these indicators do not capture the changing nature of intermediation: (5) and (6) seem to provide 
empirical evidence for the regular growth of traditional banking activities (credits and deposits) 
until 2000. This is rather puzzling given the analyses that stress the gravity of the banking crisis in 
Japan during the 1990-2000 period. The breakdown of the total intermediation ratio (1c) into a 
credit intermediation ratio (1a) and a market intermediation ratio (1b) shows more finely the 
contraction of credit and the correction enabled by the increase in market intermediation. 
Indicators which are based on stock market data are very erratic. (7) and (8) are sensitive to changes in 
securities prices and have to be interpreted with caution. Moreover, these indicators are not 
exclusive of those referring to intermediation. In other words, the evolution of intermediation 
cannot be inferred by the evolution of the stock price index or, more broadly, of market activity. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Allen and Santomero (2001) also use such indicators. 
7 The ratio of the number of domestic companies whose equities are publicly traded in Tokyo and Osaka and the 
country’s population in millions varies between 23 in 1990 and 26 in 2003 (source: FIBV). The ratio of funds raised 
through public equity offerings (both initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues) by domestic companies to 
gross fixed capital formation cannot be computed because the required data are not available for Japan in the FIBV 
database. 
8 Edey and Hviding (1995) use the OECD database. Rajan and Zingales (2003b) use data from Mitchell (1995): 
deposits and national income are extrapolated to 1999 for deposits by using the growth rate of deposits from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
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Table 2. Various Indicators of the Japanese Financial System 
 Data 
source 
1980 1990 2000 2004 
1a) Credit intermediation ratio BoJ 67% 67% 57% 49% 
1b) Market intermediation ratio BoJ 21% 20% 30% 35% 
1c) Total intermediation ratio BoJ 88% 88% 88% 85% 
2) Financial assets of all domestic sectors/GDP 
BoJ, 
IFS 
6.4 10.4 11.5 11.5 
3) Financial assets of FI/financial assets of all 
domestic sector 
BoJ 48% 52% 54% 52% 
4) Financial assets of banking sector/ financial 
assets of FI 
BoJ 62% 57% 51% 50% 
5) Bank loans to private sector/GDP IFS 83% 119% 115% 100% 
6) Deposits/GDP IFS 78% 104% 113% 124% 
7) Stock market capitalization/GDP 
FIBV, 
IFS 
na 89% 72% 75% 
8) Value of share trading/GDP 
FIBV, 
IFS 
na 47% 61% 70% 
Notes: Credit intermediation ratio = loans / external financing; Market intermediation ratio = securities held by 
financial intermediaries / external financing; Total intermediation ratio = Credit intermediation ratio + Market 
intermediation ratio. 1a), 1b) and 1c) are expressed on a book value basis. What is called the “financial intermediation 
ratio” by Edey and Hviding (1995) is the ratio of financial assets of financial institutions (including banks) to 
financial assets of all domestic sectors. What they call the “bank intermediation ratio” is the ratio of assets of the 
banking sector (we consider deposit corporations) to assets of all financial institutions. “Financial assets” is the total 
of financial account asset. “Bank loans to the private sector over GDP” is the ratio of claims on the private sector of 
deposit money banks (IFS line 22d) and GDP (IFS line 99b). “Deposits over GDP” is the ratio of demand, time and 
savings deposits of deposit money banks (IFS lines 24, 25) and GDP. Stock market capitalization to GDP is the 
aggregate market value of the equity of domestic companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (FIBV) divided by 
GDP. Value of share trading is the total amount of transactions (Domestic & Foreign, including Investment Funds) 
in Tokyo and Osaka divided by GDP. 
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4. Conclusion 
Our results show that the intermediation ratio in Japan remained quite stable between 1979 and 
2004, at around 85%. However, this stability is the result of two opposite trends: a contraction of 
credits and an increase in financial securities owned by financial (mostly public and non banking) 
institutions. We stressed also that the decrease in the credit intermediation ratio and the increase 
in the market intermediation ratio are not fully explained by a change in financial behaviors, but 
are also due to a composition effect of external financings: the decreasing share of corporations 
in the domestic non financial sector external financings makes the relative fall of loans stronger. 
Conversely, the increasing share of the general government sector accentuates the relative rise of 
securities in intermediate financings. 
At the methodological level, one of the general results of this study is that the measurement of 
intermediation ratios must be done with outstandings (better suited than flows to long period 
analyses) corrected for stock price changes. If we had used data on a market value basis, one 
would show in periods of a strong fall of the Japanese stock market (early 1990s and early 2000s) 
an increasing, but actually artificial, intermediation ratio. Similarly, a computation using data on a 
market value basis would have emphasized an artificial disintermediation during the sharp rise in 
the Japanese stock market from 1980 to 1990. In this respect, a generalization of accounting 
standards concerning market value would make the measurement of the financings structures 
even more difficult. In any case a treatment of the data would have to be systematic.  
Finally, on a theoretical level, by showing that intermediate financings increasingly consist in the 
purchasing of claims by financial intermediaries, our study confirms the close connection 
between market financings and intermediate financings and, in this respect, goes beyond the case 
of Japan. Concepts traditionally used to analyze the evolution of financial systems thus appear 
less and less operational. This is particularly true regarding the distinction between market (or 
direct) financing and intermediate (or indirect) financing, and between a bank-based system and a 
capital market-based system. Market financings are to a large extent intermediate and the 
orientation of the financial systems is basically mixed. Therefore, to characterize the structures of 
financing and their evolution over time, the relevant typology should be centered on intermediate 
financings between credit and claims investment by financial intermediaries. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Financial intermediation ratios in Japan 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
External financing of domestic nonfinancial sectors [= 1+2+3+4] 6,768 7,462 8,189 8,791 9,601 10,386 10,988 12,031 13,188 14,470 16,235 17,297 17,899 
     1. Loans  3,251 3,574 3,930 4,326 4,725 5,142 5,529 6,103 6,674 7,303 8,204 8,816 9,131 
           1.A Via domestic financial institutions 3,251 3,574 3,930 4,326 4,725 5,142 5,529 6,103 6,674 7,303 8,204 8,816 9,131 
                  1.A.1 Via public domestic financial institutions 805 917 1,033 1,161 1,279 1,371 1,450 1,525 1,596 1,695 1,826 1,938 2,032 
                  1.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 2,447 2,657 2,897 3,165 3,445 3,771 4,080 4,578 5,078 5,608 6,377 6,877 7,099 
                          1.A.2.1 Depository corporations  2,189 2,355 2,559 2,772 2,991 3,257 3,499 3,911 4,259 4,645 5,094 5,385 5,604 
                          1.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  162 189 208 228 241 260 277 286 309 349 413 502 569 
                          1.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  95 113 130 165 214 254 304 381 510 614 870 991 926 
     2. Securities other than shares 1,214 1,409 1,616 1,767 1,941 2,156 2,271 2,460 2,647 2,876 3,181 3,230 3,309 
           2.A Via domestic financial institutions 914 1,052 1,248 1,347 1,482 1,664 1,783 1,974 2,097 2,254 2,382 2,373 2,425 
                  2.A.1.Via public domestic financial institutions 291 362 445 443 473 562 610 707 839 941 1,048 1,086 1,133 
                  2.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 623 690 804 904 1,009 1,102 1,174 1,267 1,258 1,313 1,334 1,288 1,292 
                          2.A.2.1 Depository corporations  385 394 460 510 556 598 617 642 616 653 690 653 615 
                          2.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  101 115 133 153 174 194 208 225 232 251 250 245 245 
                          2.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  137 180 210 241 279 310 348 400 411 409 394 389 432 
           2.B Via domestic nonfinancial sectors 185 250 229 270 303 303 333 326 345 377 392 424 400 
           2.C Via overseas 116 107 139 150 156 189 155 161 206 245 406 433 484 
     3. Shares and other equities 318 354 397 427 458 494 581 627 704 812 945 1,016 1,086 
           3.A Via domestic financial institutions 63 71 82 94 97 109 131 148 165 201 243 261 279 
                  3.A.1.Via public domestic financial institutions 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 5 8 12 
                  3.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 59 67 78 90 94 106 128 146 163 197 238 253 267 
                          3.A.2.1 Depository corporations  26 31 36 42 43 47 53 48 51 62 77 86 92 
                          3.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  24 27 31 36 38 42 51 58 63 74 88 98 106 
                          3.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  10 10 11 12 13 17 25 40 48 61 73 70 69 
           3.B Via domestic nonfinancial sectors 251 273 302 317 342 366 429 461 524 593 678 726 768 
           3.C Via overseas 4 10 12 16 20 19 21 18 15 19 24 28 39 
     4. Trade credits  1,984 2,125 2,245 2,272 2,477 2,595 2,606 2,841 3,162 3,479 3,905 4,235 4,374 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 68% 67% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 67% 66% 67% 67% 68% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 20% 21% 22% 22% 22% 23% 23% 23% 23% 22% 21% 20% 20% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 88% 88% 89% 88% 88% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 88% 88% 87% 
Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Units: JPY 100,000 millions or %. 
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Table A1: Financial intermediation ratios in Japan (continued) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
External financing of domestic nonfinancial sectors [= 1+2+3+4] 18,132 18,640 19,252 20,386 20,740 20,978 20,841 21,379 21,743 21,668 21,706 21,932 22,338 
     1. Loans  9,468 9,754 9,959 10,125 10,211 10,292 10,232 10,206 10,042 9,932 9,603 9,295 9,054 
           1.A Via domestic financial institutions 9,468 9,754 9,959 10,125 10,211 10,292 10,232 10,206 10,042 9,932 9,603 9,295 9,054 
                  1.A.1 Via public domestic financial institutions 2,183 2,426 2,658 2,761 2,930 3,040 3,106 3,293 3,346 3,363 3,306 3,175 3,069 
                  1.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 7,285 7,328 7,301 7,364 7,281 7,252 7,126 6,913 6,696 6,569 6,298 6,119 5,985 
                          1.A.2.1 Depository corporations  5,782 5,820 5,830 5,953 5,980 5,965 5,836 5,703 5,601 5,477 5,171 5,013 4,892 
                          1.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  617 636 652 641 627 600 566 533 482 456 436 409 377 
                          1.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  887 872 819 770 674 687 724 676 614 636 691 697 717 
     2. Securities other than shares 3,420 3,598 3,830 4,195 4,498 4,760 5,029 5,502 5,922 6,140 6,485 7,107 7,618 
           2.A Via domestic financial institutions 2,610 2,875 3,042 3,382 3,607 3,829 4,085 4,669 5,026 5,188 5,506 5,976 6,190 
                  2.A.1.Via public domestic financial institutions 1,228 1,356 1,407 1,642 1,785 1,973 2,162 2,127 2,015 2,445 2,552 2,679 2,731 
                  2.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 1,382 1,519 1,635 1,740 1,822 1,856 1,923 2,543 3,011 2,744 2,954 3,297 3,459 
                          2.A.2.1 Depository corporations  639 704 745 744 745 762 824 1,103 1,352 1,264 1,403 1,729 1,825 
                          2.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  276 333 410 498 561 589 615 789 924 900 949 1,020 1,063 
                          2.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  467 481 481 497 516 504 484 651 735 580 601 548 571 
           2.B Via domestic nonfinancial sectors 405 383 488 498 555 583 554 532 558 684 689 809 1,038 
           2.C Via overseas 404 340 299 315 336 348 390 300 339 268 290 323 390 
     3. Shares and other equities 1,109 1,167 1,213 1,255 1,294 1,335 1,354 1,466 1,517 1,540 1,571 1,532 1,642 
           3.A Via domestic financial institutions 285 299 286 281 296 285 296 266 295 309 317 271 283 
                  3.A.1.Via public domestic financial institutions 16 18 22 23 25 27 33 26 31 36 43 35 32 
                  3.A.2 Via private domestic financial institutions 270 281 264 258 271 258 263 240 264 273 275 236 251 
                          3.A.2.1 Depository corporations  94 99 97 101 105 101 104 88 95 89 86 78 85 
                          3.A.2.2 Insurance and pension funds  110 115 106 104 112 110 105 93 100 104 99 86 89 
                          3.A.2.3 Other financial intermediaries  66 66 61 54 55 48 54 59 70 80 90 72 78 
           3.B Via domestic nonfinancial sectors 782 814 873 902 914 961 947 1,034 1,068 1,074 1,102 1,072 1,139 
           3.C Via overseas 42 54 54 72 83 89 111 166 154 157 152 189 219 
     4. Trade credits  4,135 4,121 4,250 4,811 4,738 4,590 4,226 4,206 4,262 4,056 4,047 3,998 4,024 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 68% 67% 66% 65% 64% 63% 62% 59% 57% 56% 54% 52% 49% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 21% 22% 22% 24% 24% 25% 26% 29% 30% 31% 33% 35% 35% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 88% 89% 89% 89% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 87% 87% 85% 
Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Units: JPY 100,000 millions or %. 
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Table A2: Financial intermediation ratios in Japan - Domestic nonfinancial corporations 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
External financing of domestic nonfinancial corporations [= 1+2+3+4] 4,275 4,622 5,015 5,287 5,710 6,143 6,415 7,009 7,740 8,566 9,809 10,521 10,923 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 2,008 2,199 2,411 2,648 2,865 3,120 3,345 3,634 3,907 4,221 4,722 5,078 5,195 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 392 442 491 535 573 608 632 596 592 617 666 689 730 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 1,616 1,757 1,921 2,113 2,292 2,512 2,713 3,038 3,314 3,603 4,056 4,389 4,465 
     2. Securities other than shares 407 414 471 506 541 602 599 649 728 883 1,140 1,159 1,189 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  306 309 364 386 413 465 471 521 577 692 854 851 871 
     3. Shares and other equities 318 354 397 427 458 494 581 627 704 812 945 1,016 1,086 
          3A. Via domestic financial institutions  63 71 82 94 97 109 131 148 165 201 243 261 279 
     4. Trade credits c) 1,542 1,655 1,735 1,706 1,846 1,928 1,889 2,099 2,401 2,649 3,001 3,268 3,453 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 73% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 73% 71% 69% 70% 70% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 14% 13% 14% 13% 13% 14% 13% 14% 14% 15% 16% 15% 15% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 88% 87% 88% 87% 86% 85% 85% 85% 
 
 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
External financing of domestic nonfinancial corporations [= 1+2+3+4] 10,913 11,084 11,189 11,639 11,590 11,389 10,718 10,578 10,418 10,019 9,724 9,418 9,366 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 5,341 5,424 5,378 5,262 5,086 4,957 4,760 4,639 4,419 4,272 3,995 3,756 3,619 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 763 840 876 881 890 862 831 854 852 889 889 868 849 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 4,578 4,584 4,501 4,381 4,196 4,095 3,929 3,785 3,568 3,384 3,106 2,888 2,770 
     2. Securities other than shares 1,208 1,210 1,241 1,296 1,352 1,334 1,232 1,164 1,167 1,104 1,089 1,065 1,062 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  922 967 986 1,045 1,084 1,073 1,001 988 990 933 924 895 863 
     3. Shares and other equities 1,109 1,167 1,213 1,255 1,294 1,335 1,354 1,466 1,517 1,540 1,571 1,532 1,642 
          3A. Via domestic financial institutions  285 299 286 281 296 285 296 266 295 309 317 271 283 
     4. Trade credits 3,256 3,283 3,356 3,826 3,859 3,762 3,372 3,309 3,315 3,104 3,070 3,065 3,044 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 70% 70% 69% 67% 66% 65% 65% 64% 62% 62% 60% 59% 57% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 16% 16% 16% 17% 18% 18% 18% 17% 18% 18% 19% 18% 18% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 86% 86% 85% 84% 84% 83% 82% 81% 80% 80% 79% 77% 75% 
Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Units: JPY 100,000 millions or %. 
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Table A3: Financial intermediation ratios in Japan - Private nonfinancial corporations 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
External financing of private nonfinancial corporations [= 1+2+3+4] 3,823 4,117 4,454 4,671 5,038 5,432 5,662 6,268 6,976 7,777 8,964 9,651 10,092 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 1,787 1,947 2,132 2,341 2,533 2,766 2,973 3,298 3,565 3,870 4,359 4,717 4,857 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 171 191 211 228 240 254 260 259 251 267 303 328 392 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 1,616 1,757 1,921 2,113 2,292 2,512 2,713 3,038 3,314 3,603 4,056 4,389 4,465 
     2. Securities other than shares 201 189 222 233 240 287 264 293 357 501 718 715 764 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  151 141 172 178 184 222 207 235 283 392 538 525 560 
     3. Shares and other equities 294 326 365 391 419 451 536 579 652 757 885 952 1,018 
          3A. Via domestic financial institutions  58 65 76 86 88 99 121 137 153 187 228 245 261 
     4. Trade credits c) 1,542 1,655 1,735 1,706 1,846 1,928 1,889 2,099 2,401 2,649 3,001 3,268 3,453 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 78% 79% 78% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 78% 75% 73% 74% 73% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 9% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 11% 13% 12% 12% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 88% 87% 88% 88% 88% 88% 87% 88% 87% 87% 86% 86% 86% 
 
 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
External financing of private nonfinancial corporations [= 1+2+3+4] 10,031 10,145 10,194 10,602 10,514 10,320 9,774 9,612 9,452 9,017 8,722 8,480 8,339 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 4,991 5,058 5,000 4,874 4,687 4,545 4,393 4,241 4,006 3,805 3,499 3,267 3,123 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 413 474 499 494 491 450 464 456 438 421 393 379 353 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 4,578 4,584 4,501 4,381 4,196 4,095 3,929 3,785 3,568 3,384 3,106 2,888 2,770 
     2. Securities other than shares 746 714 706 734 765 773 757 703 725 702 715 697 674 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  570 571 561 592 613 622 615 596 616 593 607 586 548 
     3. Shares and other equities 1,038 1,090 1,132 1,168 1,203 1,240 1,252 1,359 1,405 1,407 1,439 1,450 1,498 
          3A. Via domestic financial institutions  267 279 267 262 275 265 274 247 273 282 291 257 259 
     4. Trade credits 3,256 3,283 3,356 3,826 3,859 3,762 3,372 3,309 3,315 3,104 3,070 3,065 3,044 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 74% 74% 73% 72% 70% 69% 69% 67% 65% 64% 62% 60% 59% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 12% 12% 12% 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 15% 16% 16% 15% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 86% 86% 85% 85% 84% 83% 82% 81% 80% 79% 78% 76% 74% 
Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Units: JPY 100,000 millions or %. 
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Table A4: Financial intermediation ratios in Japan - General government 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
External financing of general government [= 1+2] 1,157 1,374 1,573 1,750 1,982 2,184 2,358 2,620 2,778 2,906 3,046 3,130 3,178 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 247 277 316 367 423 460 500 592 625 659 696 737 754 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 231 255 286 330 376 402 431 516 558 591 629 668 677 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 16 22 31 37 47 58 69 75 67 68 67 69 77 
     2. Securities other than shares 808 995 1,145 1,261 1,401 1,554 1,672 1,811 1,919 1,993 2,041 2,071 2,120 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  608 743 884 961 1,069 1,199 1,313 1,453 1,520 1,561 1,528 1,522 1,554 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2+3)] 21% 20% 20% 21% 21% 21% 21% 23% 23% 23% 23% 24% 24% 
Market intermediation ratio [= (2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 53% 54% 56% 55% 54% 55% 56% 55% 55% 54% 50% 49% 49% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A+3A) / (1+2+3)] 74% 74% 76% 76% 75% 76% 77% 78% 77% 76% 73% 72% 73% 
 
 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
External financing of general government [= 1+2] 3,348 3,610 3,927 4,406 4,738 5,146 5,666 6,353 6,917 7,330 7,741 8,375 8,853 
     1. Loans via domestic financial institutions 830 920 1,036 1,143 1,255 1,370 1,506 1,607 1,733 1,838 1,890 1,897 1,869 
               1.A.1 Via public financial institutions 749 830 938 1,041 1,145 1,249 1,345 1,486 1,542 1,553 1,568 1,538 1,512 
               1.A.2 Via private financial institutions 81 90 98 102 110 121 161 121 191 285 321 359 357 
     2. Securities other than shares 2,212 2,388 2,588 2,898 3,147 3,426 3,797 4,337 4,756 5,037 5,396 6,042 6,557 
          2A. Via domestic financial institutions  1,688 1,908 2,056 2,337 2,523 2,756 3,085 3,681 4,036 4,256 4,581 5,081 5,328 
Credit intermediation ratio [= 1 / (1+2)] 25% 25% 26% 26% 26% 27% 27% 25% 25% 25% 24% 23% 21% 
Market intermediation ratio [= 2A / (1+2)] 50% 53% 52% 53% 53% 54% 54% 58% 58% 58% 59% 61% 60% 
Total intermediation ratio [= (1+2A) / (1+2)] 75% 78% 79% 79% 80% 80% 81% 83% 83% 83% 84% 83% 81% 
Data: Flow of Funds Account – Bank of Japan. Outstandings on a book value basis. Units: JPY 100,000 millions or %. 
 
 
